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Effort and Moral Worth
Kelly Sorensen

As to it’s being to [G. E. Moore’s] ‘credit’ to be childlike, – I can’t
understand that; unless it’s also to a child’s credit. For you aren’t talking
of the innocence a man has fought for, but of an innocence which comes
from a natural absence of a temptation.
– Wittgenstein1

Many of us feel the pull of Wittgenstein’s intuition that effort deserves
moral credit. There’s something admirable about effort expended towards some
morally good end. But many of us also feel the pull of the opposite intuition –
that the “natural absence of a temptation” deserves moral credit as well. I believe
that we can consistently hold both of these intuitions. I also believe that exploring
them leads to some interesting entailments about the moral assessment of effort.
It’s this – the moral assessment of effort – which I’ll explore in this paper. Not
everyone will share all the intuitions I’ll attempt to elicit; but I take it that my
intuitions are not idiosyncratic, and in any case it will be worthwhile for the reader
to explore the specific intuitions he or she has. Some readers who don’t begin
with my intuitions may be persuaded to agree with them later.

1

Ludwig Wittgenstein, quoted in Malcolm (1984, p. 116).
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Consider two agents, both of whom perform the same rather ordinary
morally good act: they donate $100 to UNICEF. Both donate for the same good
reason: they want to help disadvantaged children, and both share the belief that
money donated to UNICEF is an effective means to this goal. We will suppose
that this is a reasonable belief – one both agents reached through considered moral
reflection on the information available. Some of us will think the donation is
morally required, others that it is supererogatory or perhaps one of various ways of
fulfilling an imperfect duty, but this shouldn’t matter much: intuitions about the
agents will be similar, if perhaps of different magnitude, whatever one’s views
here. Both agents are in the same reasonably decent economic circumstances:
$100 is a non-trivial amount of money for both, but not enough to deprive them of
ordinary necessities. In fact, the only difference between the two agents is the
effort involved in the two donations.
Janette, the first agent, effortlessly makes her donation. As she makes out
the check, she feels no internal psychological resistance – no temptation to spend
the money on something for herself or her family, and no temptation to add it to
her savings account. She seems to have no morally bad desires working against
her morally good desires. Sharing her resources is easy for Janette.
Nigel, on the other hand, struggles to make out his check. Like Janette, he
has reflectively decided to donate to UNICEF and believes his decision to be a
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good decision. But Nigel finds himself fighting a variety of inclinations against
donating. Among them is a standard array of selfish desires to keep the money or
buy something else. It's far worse than this, however. Nigel finds himself with
very strong – even pathological – desires not to donate. Suppose that Nigel has
some sort of phobia against donating: like the claustrophobic who finds it
enormously difficult to enter a crowded elevator, Nigel is pathologically reluctant
to part with his resources. For Nigel to act on his decision to donate is for him to
trigger psychic turmoil and excruciating nightmares. Nigel believes that these
responses are irrational, but this belief does not make them go away.
Nevertheless, with enormous – even heroic – effort, Nigel mails his check.
Many of us would assign positive moral worth to both acts, even though
Janette acted effortlessly and Nigel only with enormous effort. By “moral worth,”
I mean a second-order moral evaluation: some act is morally worthy if it meets
some criterion for praise.2 There are many candidate criteria for moral worth;
among the factors in these criteria are motives, intentions, and effort. For now I'm

2

For locutionary convenience, in this paper I will talk about the moral worth of actions. Agents

and traits can also have moral worth. For a broader treatment of moral worth and its objects, see
Arpaly (2004), and {self-identifying reference omitted}.
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only interested in effort.3 Assume Janette and Nigel are equivalent in other ways,
but on opposite ends of the spectrum with respect to effort. Strangely, both
Janette and Nigel's acts seem morally worthy and admirable. If so, effort is a
more complex notion than is generally thought in discussions of moral worth.
After more exploration, I think we'll be able to explain our apparently paradoxical
evaluations of the moral worth of Janette and Nigel.

1.

Effort Required and Effort Expended
Janette and Nigel appear to be on two ends of a spectrum of effort. How

would we evaluate other cases along the spectrum? I believe that Figure 1 tracks
many initial intuitions about effort. The Y-axis is moral worth; the greater an act's
moral worth, the higher we plot it on the Y-axis. (Remember that for now we're
only interested in moral worth as it is affected by effort). The X-axis is effort.
The greater the effort involved in an act, the more to the right we plot it on the Xaxis. Suppose that Janette donates effortlessly; this effortlessness has a high
moral worth, as the diagram reflects. Now: what happens to our evaluations of
moral worth as we imagine more and more effort involved in (successfully)

3

Unless otherwise noted, when I use the term “moral worth,” I'll only be talking about moral worth

with respect to effort. Other factors are certainly relevant to moral worth; but I'll ignore them for
now.
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performing the same act – donating $100 to UNICEF? It seems to me that the
moral worth of the action goes down; the more effort required to perform the act,
the less admirable it seems. At some point, however, the trajectory changes.
Once enough effort is expended, we seem to evaluate the moral worth of the act
more and more positively. The more it approaches heroic levels, effort appears to
be highly morally worthy after all.

Figure 1
Moral Worth
Janette

Nigel

Effort

Consider some cases along the spectrum to help exercise our intuitions.
Kent is similar to Janette; for Kent, little effort is involved in donating. Kent
pauses as he writes out the check; he thinks for a few moments about the new
briefcase he'd like to purchase with the $100, but finally shrugs and puts the check
in the mail. More effort was involved in Kent's donation than Janette's, and
accordingly his action seems to be less morally worthy. (Perhaps it helps to move
in the opposite direction. First, imagine the moral worth you would assign Kent
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for his donation, including his brush with selfishness. Now imagine the moral
worth you would assign to someone who donated with no self-interested
resistance at all. Pure effortlessness seems more admirable.)
Lori is another step further away from Janette. Lori feels a variety of selfinterested desires to keep the money or spend it on something for herself. She
feels these contra-moral self-interested desires with enough strength that it finally
takes her considerable effort to write out her check. Lori's act seems to have even
less moral worth than Kent's, if any at all. After all, it's only $100 – a non-trivial
amount for all the agents, but not enough to impact their lifestyles deeply.
Donating shouldn’t be as hard as it is for Lori, and accordingly we don’t seem to
find her act very praiseworthy.
Max feels all of the contra-moral self-interested desires Lori feels, but he
expends even more effort. Lori's battle with these desires took place within a few
minutes at her desk; but it's even harder for Max. Max gets up from his desk and
paces; he starts to sweat as he rehearses to himself the importance of donating.
He knows $100 isn't a lot of money, but he finds himself struggling very hard to
go through with his intention to donate. Hours later, after a great deal of internal
struggle, he drops a check in the mailbox.

7

Figure 2

Moral Worth
N

J
K

M
L

Effort

Effort seems to taint the praiseworthiness of the donation as we move
from a case like Janette's to a case like Kent's. It's a good thing that both donated,
of course; but Janette's act seems morally special in a way that Kent's is not; and
Kent's action seems more morally special than Lori's. Lori's various pedestrian
temptations threaten to rob her action of most of its moral worth. But evaluations
of moral worth seem to turn a corner from Lori to Max. There's something
morally admirable, if not morally ideal, about Max's hard-won victory. Nigel
seems even more worthy of praise – he donates, even though in doing so he fights
against severe nightmares and pathological internal turmoil.
At this point, some readers will be uncomfortable: graphs of the sort I
offer above are often associated with quantification, precision, empirical inquiry –
inquiries all importantly different from most ethical theorizing. Graphs do not
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belong in ethics, the worry continues, because they import improper approaches
from the sciences. But in fact the graph above (and those that follow) need not
commit us in this way at all. These graphs portray only trajectories and contours;
to note the contours of our starting views about effort and moral worth is not to
believe that one can quantify praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. For the
same reason, the graphs also need not entail precision: they represent contours,
something one can know without knowing with precision the moral worth of
someone’s donation. Finally, one need do no fieldwork or gather empirical data
to draw these diagrams, except in the unusual sense in which our starting
intuitions about moral matters are a sort of data.
In fact, graphs of the sort employed here are a powerful and underutilized
methodology in ethics. Graphs can help identify issues and entailments that are
hard to see otherwise. And graphs can also extend the power of the reflective
equilibrium approach that has generated so much rich philosophical work in the
last decades. Only recently have ethicists begun to employ graphical resources,
but the results have been impressive.4
4

Some of the best examples include Parfit (1984), Kagan (1999), Hurka (2001), and Temkin

(1996). Some uncomfortable readers will not be assuaged by this list, since all of these authors are
consequentialists. Perhaps consequentialists find it more natural to think in terms of graphs. But I
see no necessary connection here: non-consequentialists can certainly benefit from diagrammatic
methodology as well.
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Let’s turn back to the specific diagram above. What explains the
somewhat odd intuitions that it portrays? I think there are two separable notions
of effort in these evaluations. Distinguishing them should help clarify our
intuitions about effort and moral worth.
The first is the Effort Required to perform an act. Individuals differ in the
amount of effort each must put forth to perform a given action. Various factors
explain these differences: the balance and strength of moral, non-moral, and
contra-moral desires, intellectual capabilities, physical capabilities, etc. For
Janette, no effort is required to donate; for Lori, considerable effort is required to
donate; and for Nigel, immense effort is required to donate. We might picture
Janette as having no non-moral or contra-moral desires that oppose her strong
moral desires to help children. On the other extreme, we can imagine Nigel
overwhelmed by non-moral and contra-moral desires, as well as significant
psychological obstacles. In terms of Effort Required alone, we seem to evaluate
actions less and less positively as the Effort Required to perform them increases.
That Lori, Max, and Nigel are the sort of people who have to try as hard as each
does to donate indicates something morally defective about their acts.5 Of the five
5

Some think that only the desires and capabilities one has voluntarily, or as the result of voluntary

choices and actions, count in the evaluation of moral worth. In other words, Max's obstacles count
against his act's moral worth only if he has somehow voluntarily brought them on himself. Others
disagree (see Adams, 1985). Readers in the first group should restrict their attention to those
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donations, Nigel's has the least moral worth in terms of Effort Required – it takes
the most effort for him to perform an ordinary moral act, and this doesn't seem
praiseworthy. Janette's donation is the most praiseworthy in terms of Effort
Required, since the only effort it takes for her to donate is the bare physical energy
to move her hand to make out the check.6
obstacles that are voluntarily obtained. (Note that this group may have some difficulty imagining
that Nigel could have voluntarily come to feel such intense pathological resistance to donating.)
Readers in the second group can think more ecumenically about obstacles.
Relatedly, some think it matters whether the obstacles come from circumstances outside
or instead inside the agent’s character. Again, readers in the first group will need to focus on a
restricted set of obstacles. See Foot (1978, pp. 11-14), Hursthouse (1999, pp. 94-99), and
Sidgwick (1981, pp. 224-225, 429). My thanks to Steve Sverdlik for discussion here.
6

Kant also believed that minimal Effort Required can be morally worthy – a fact that may come as

a surprise to those who only know him through the Groundwork. For Kant, the path to becoming a
good human being requires both a change of heart and a “gradual reform of sensibility” – that is, a
reform of one’s sensible or empirical nature (Kant, 1999, 6:47). One’s “sensibility” includes
inclinations and passions and other mental states that an agent has passively, with no active
contribution of his own. For Kant, agents with high moral character have actualized those
counterfactual situations where one’s sensible nature is brought more into accord with reason and
the moral law. Agents who have done so are moral not so much by habit, since that connotes
something merely mechanical and automatic, but instead by what Kant calls proficiency or facility
[Fertigkeit]. (Kant discusses “proficiency,” or the “subjective perfection of the capacity of choice,”
in the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant, 1996, 6:407). He also says this elsewhere: “Reason gradually
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The second aspect of effort is the Effort Expended in performing an act.
Again, since individuals differ in terms of their desires and capabilities, they will
expend different amounts of effort in performing the same acts. Janette expends
no effort, Lori expends considerable effort, and Nigel expends immense effort in
their successful attempts to perform a moral action. We picture Max and Nigel
working very hard in order to do what they (correctly) believe is right. In terms of
Effort Expended alone, we seem to evaluate actions more and more positively as
the Effort Expended increases. Max and Nigel put forth energy and effort that
the other agents don't, and that expenditure of effort seems to command our
respect. Of the five agents, Janette has the least moral worth in terms of Effort
Expended – she expends only the smallest imaginable effort in making out her
check. Nigel has the most moral worth in terms of Effort Expended, since he
worked the hardest of any of the agents.7

draws sensibility into a state of proficiency (habitus)” (Reflexionen 5611, 252; quoted in Munzel,
1999, pp. 91-92).) Actualizing counterfactual situations where one is morally proficient has a very
high moral value for Kant. That Kant’s considered position is close to Aristotle’s is a surprise to
many.
7

Just as it might comes as a surprise to some that Kant can value minimal Effort Required, so it

might come as a surprise that there is evidence that Aristotle values high degrees of Effort
Expended. Aristotle says that “both art and virtue are always concerned with what is harder; for
even the good is better when it is harder” (1984a, 1105a10; see also 1984b, 1365a). Aristotle is

12

We seem to evaluate these two aspects of effort differently – in fact,
oppositely. The moral worth associated with each aspect of effort seems to rise in
opposite directions, as the following diagrams show.
Figure 3
Moral Worth

Moral Worth

Effort Required

Effort Expended

If we were to combine the diagrams – that is, add together their respective
weights for moral worth at each point – we would create a single diagram that
looks like Figure 2 above. But we would now understand that diagram to
represent two different evaluations of effort. Call Figure 2 the Combined
Diagram. In general, call diagrams that attempt to represent both Effort Required
and Effort Expended combined effort curves. As long as we remember that there
are two aspects of effort at work in Figure 2, this combined curve will help us
visualize other issues in the moral evaluation of effort.
speaking in this context of someone (like Nigel) who is not an ideal agent – someone for whom
performing a good action means fighting against contra-moral pleasures. But Aristotle finds at
least something to admire even in this non-ideal agent.
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What kind of values are Effort Required and Effort Expended? For most
of the claims I want to make, the specific account is not important, but here is one
plausible view. The value of effortlessness (that is, little or no Effort Required) is
a relation between doing a right action and the virtuous state of character that
makes the action easy. If the former were absent – if an agent didn’t actually do
the right thing – there would be no value of this specific sort. Effort Expended is
a relation between doing a right action and the deficient state of character that
makes the action hard. Again, if the former were absent – if an agent didn’t
actually do the right thing – there would be no value of this sort. Conceived in
this way, the two are what we might call dependent or second-order values; their
intrinsic value depends on the existence of a first-order intrinsic good: i.e. the
doing of a right action.8
8

This account parallels Michael Slote’s view that the value of some goods is dependent on other

goods (Slote, 1983), and Thomas Hurka’s related defense of virtue and desert as dependent or
higher-level intrinsic values (Hurka, 2001a). For Hurka, virtue is a relation between attitudes and
more basic intrinsic goods. For instance, the intrinsic value of virtue obtains when an agent feels
pleasure at the pleasure of another person, or (in the case of compassion) pain at another’s pain.
Desert has a parallel higher-level structure. The intrinsic value of desert obtains when an agent is
virtuous and also feeling pleasure, or (for fans of retributivism) is vicious and also feels pain.
Hurka notes that certain combinations between lower-level states are intrinsically bad. In
the case of virtue, feeling pleasure at another’s pain (sadism) is intrinsically bad. The same seems
true for the two kinds of effort above – certain combinations are bad. Being able to act rightly
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There are at least two competing accounts of why Effort Required and
Effort Expended have intrinsic value. Again, for most of the claims ahead, it
doesn’t matter which account is correct, although some readers will find that only
one of them supports the relevant intuitions. Both accounts fit the structural
claims about effort in the previous paragraph. The first account is Aristotelian: it
says that Janette’s effortlessness has value because she has settled, robust good
character traits – traits that dispose her to benevolence and unselfishness – and
because donating $100 to UNICEF actualizes those traits. The settled character
traits have value in themselves, and, importantly, the additional value of
effortlessness is explained by the actualization of those traits. A second account
attends only to the agent’s occurrent psychological state – her state at the moment
with virtuous ease, combined with not acting, may be bad; and being able to act rightly only with
significant effort, combined with not acting, is also bad.
I have described effort as a relation between some state of character and doing a right
action. This means that what we might call external considerations can contribute to the moral
worth of effort. For instance, an agent’s being able to successfully perform an action can depend
on outside influences – Janette and Nigel can’t write a check to UNICEF if others, say, physically
restrain them from doing so. Those who believe moral worth is only ever constituted by internal
factors will want to change the sample account above in the following way: effortlessness is a
relation between intending a right action and the virtuous state of character that makes the action
easy; and effort expended is a relation between intending a right action and the deficient state of
character that makes the action hard.
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of action. Whether Janette has settled, robust traits does not matter; all that
matters is that a good action is supported by a set of psychological components
that make it easy.9 The two accounts also say parallel things about Nigel. An
advocate of the first (Aristotelian) account will tend to conceive of Nigel’s
effortful action as valuable because he has settled, robust traits that dispose him to
conquer strong contra-moral temptations, and also because he actualizes those
traits in the UNICEF donation. The settled pro-moral conquering traits and the
apparently settled temptations have different value valences, but, again
importantly, the value of the effortfulness is explained by the successful
actualization of the conquering traits. Aristotelians will think Nigel’s continent
action is clearly less worthy than Janette’s effortless action, and as we will see
below, there are additional reasons for thinking so. But an Aristotelian account
can certainly explain why Effort Expended has at least some value.10 The second
account of why effortful action is valuable is more straightforward, since only the
agent’s occurrent psychological state matters. All that matters in evaluating Nigel
is that he mails the check because at the time he has enough psychological
strength to successfully donate.

9

The second account fits the views of W. D. Ross and Thomas Hurka. For a defense of an
occurrent state account of virtue, see Hurka (2006).
10
Recall the Aristotle text from note 7, which, although it does not specify settled traits to expend
effort, does seem to permit Aristotelians to value continent Effort Expended.
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Turning again to Figure 3, four elements of the diagrams already need
defense. The first is a feature of the individual lines. I've drawn both lines as
curves – curves with not much slope as they first move up from the X-axis, then
with increasingly steep slope as they go on. I could have instead drawn straight
diagonal lines for both diagrams; in that case, the Combined Diagram would not
be a bowl, but a straight horizontal line (see Figure 4). Adding the weights of
Effort Required and Effort Expected would yield the same value at any point on
the diagram.

Figure 4
Moral Worth

Effort

But Figure 4 does not match our considered intuitions: it represents all five agents
– Janette, Kent, Lori, Max, and Nigel – as having equivalent moral worth with
respect to effort. To see why Effort Required and Effort Expended should be
represented with curved lines, consider each individually. First take Effort
Expended. We don't think of expended effort as morally special or praiseworthy

17

in modest quantities. That's why the initial part of the curve has almost no slope:
Kent's brief thoughts about buying a briefcase and Lori's multiple self-interested
desires require both to work harder than Janette to donate, but neither aspect of
effort seems significant enough to be worthy of much praise. By contrast, the
curve rises more steeply from Max to Nigel; at heroic levels of expended effort,
an action seems worthy of exponentially higher praise. If the line were straight –
that is, if increases in Effort Expended raised moral worth proportionately – Kent,
Lori, and Max's moral worth would be higher than they seem to be on our
considered intuitions (see Figure 5).

Figure 5
Moral Worth

M
L
K

Effort Expended

The considerations for Effort Required are similar. That it takes Kent and Lori
much effort at all to perform a relatively ordinary moral act seems to taint the
moral worth of their donations more rapidly than a straight-line characterization
would capture. Nigel is evaluated as not much below Max in Figure 6 on the
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assumption that at higher levels of required effort, less and less moral worth is
lost.

Figure 6
Moral Worth

K
L
M

Effort Required

The second element of these diagrams that needs defense is this: Effort
Required has a maximum value for moral worth, but Effort Expended may not. In
other words, moral worth due to Effort Required has a logical limit: zero or no
Effort Required. Janette represents this logical limit. It can’t take less effort for
Janette to donate than no effort at all. Does Effort Expended have some similar
logical limit? The answer to this question depends on how we conceive of Effort
Expended. On the one hand, if we conceive of Effort Expended as the percentage
of effort an agent could possibly exert, then it has a logical limit: 100%. Call this
view the Percentage View. On this view, Nigel is close to exerting all the effort
he possibly can to donate. On the other hand, if we conceive of Effort Expended
as an absolute value, it has no such limit. Nigel’s heroic expenditure of effort can
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be bested by anyone with more capacity for moral resistance. Call this view the
Absolute View. On this account, there may be some empirical human limit for
Effort Expended – say, some limit beyond which any member of homo sapiens
would perish. But this would be different from a logical limit. I’ll bracket the
question of which of these accounts of Effort Expended is preferable by assuming
that Nigel is near both sorts of limit: suppose Nigel is exerting close to 100% of
his possible effort, and suppose he is near the limit of effort beyond which any
human being would perish.11 I’ll tend to discuss Effort Expended in terms of the
Absolute View in what follows, with observations about the Percentage View
generally left in footnotes.
The third element of these diagrams that needs defense is the symmetry of
the two curves. That is, I've drawn the curves so that Janette's moral worth
“score” is the same as Nigel's in Figure 2, with both equidistant from Lori in terms
of Effort Required and Effort Expended. Both sides of the “bowl” shape are
symmetrical with respect to the other side. But this may not be correct. Consider
three issues.
11

Note that on the Percentage View of Effort Expended, any agent can get a high moral worth

score: agents with modest capacities for exerting effort can score as high as agents with
tremendous capacities for exerting effort, as long as they are exerting all the effort they possibly
can. On the Absolute View of Effort Expended, agents with modest capabilities for exerting effort
cannot score as high as agents with greater capabilities for exerting effort.
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First, perhaps the individual curves in Figure 3 have different slopes. For
example, it's possible to think that Effort Required counts more towards moral
worth than Effort Expended. If this is so, the curve for Effort Expended will rise
more gently, and the combination of the two figures will generate a curve like
Figure 7.

Figure 7
Moral Worth
Janette

Effort

The second point is similar but stronger. It's possible to hold that no
amount of Effort Expended will ever be able to equal the pure absence of Effort
Required. On this view, one can never achieve as much moral worth for
expending effort as one can for not needing to.12 On the Percentage View of
12

What about the opposite intuition – that no lack of Effort Required will ever be able to equal

high amounts of Effort Expended? I’ll set this intuition aside for this paper, but here are a few
brief notes about it. In this case, Nigel's moral worth score would function as a sort of limit that a
no-effort-required agent like Janette act could never reach. Graphically, we could represent this in
at least three ways. First, the left (Effort Required) side of the curve could rise more gently
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Effort Expended, this view is expressed naturally in Figure 7: the right side of the
curve simply ends below Janette’s moral worth score. On the Absolute View of
Effort Expended, we’ll need to say more. Here, perhaps the right side of the
combined curve flattens out at the top as it goes on (the dotted line in Figure 8),
with Janette's moral worth score functioning as a sort of asymptote that an effortexpending agent's act can never reach. I'll need to refer to this position later; so
I'll call combined effort curves that match it effort-expended asymptotic.

(similar to the way the right side rises more gently in Figure 7). Second, the left (Effort Required)
side of the curve could flatten out on the top (similar to the way the right side flattens out in Figure
8). Either of these two approaches would fit a Percentage View of Effort Expended. A third
approach takes advantage of the fact that Effort Required has a logical limit – zero or no Effort
Required (Janette) – but Effort Expended on the Absolute View does not. On this approach, we
don’t flatten or change the slope of either side of the curve, but rather let the Effort Expended side
outrun the Effort Required side by letting it go on. To match the intuition being explored in this
footnote, Effort Expended would need to outrun Effort Required within the empirical human limit
for Effort Expended noted above.
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Figure 8
Moral Worth
Janette

Effort

Third, perhaps the individual curves themselves are different in some
important way. For example, I'm inclined to believe that the Effort Required
curve does not flatten out on the bottom. Instead, I think it looks like Figure 9. If
this is right, the Effort Required part of Nigel's moral worth is significantly lower
than Max's, contrary to what I assumed in Figure 6. Combining the Effort
Required curve in Figure 9 with the standard Effort Expended curve from Figure 3
may yield Figure 8. Let me put all this another way: if the Effort Required curve
drops in a certain way at the bottom, it may explain the intuition that combined
effort curves are effort-expended asymptotic.13
13

Remember that effort-expended asymptotism assumes the Absolute View of Effort Expended.

But Figure 9 is also relevant to the Percentage View. Here’s how. Combining the Effort Required
curve in Figure 9 with the standard (Percentage View) Effort Expended curve from Figure 3 may
yield Figure 7. Put another way, if the Effort Required curve drops in a certain way at the bottom,
it may explain the intuition that combined effort curves have a more gentle slope on the right side.

23

Figure 9
Moral Worth

Effort Required

On to the fourth element about the diagrams that needs defense: Can the
two kinds of effort legitimately be combined in the same graph at all? Some think
not: the praiseworthiness associated with minimal Effort Required is of a quite
different, perhaps even incommensurable, type than the praiseworthiness
associated with strong Effort Expended. The moral worth of minimal Effort
Required is the moral worth of a stable, developed character – the sort that
Aristotle most admired. By contrast, strong Effort Expended is mere continence,
a term Aristotelians use to pick out something not just less admirable than stable
character, but also different in kind: continence is a stopgap measure employed by
those without an admirable settled character, and so doesn’t deserve to be charted
on the same diagram.
I think the two sorts of effort can indeed be thought of together
graphically. First, unless one believes in a very stark form of incommensurability,
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nothing prohibits us from thinking about how different types of effort might be
evaluated together. Second, it’s not always true that strong Effort Expended is a
desperate stopgap measure. As the Aristotelian defense of Effort Expended noted
earlier, the capacity to exert oneself strongly against contra-moral desires may
itself be an element of strong, developed character. In fact we should be surprised
if any agents in the real world ever manage without such a capacity. For the
considerations that remain below, Aristotelians in particular can assume that
Nigel, Max, and others in the right zone of the graph are stable effort expenders
by way of good moral education and training.
There is one more crucial difference between Effort Required and Effort
Expended; I discuss it in section 4 below.

2.

Demandingness
For simplicity, so far we've only been considering various agents’ effort

and moral worth with respect to the same ordinary act. But agents aren't the only
thing that can vary in these evaluations; acts themselves come in degrees of
demandingness. The act of giving $100 to UNICEF is more demanding than the
act of giving $1, and acts of giving much more – $10,000, all one's resources,
perhaps even one's very life – can be very demanding indeed. How does what we
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might call the objective demandingness of the act figure in to the diagrams we've
been considering?
Set aside for a moment the considerations just above about candidate
asymmetries; let’s return to the symmetrical, bowl-shaped Combined Diagram
(Figure 2). Our intuitions are that the more demanding an act is, the more morally
worthy it can be. Put another way, more demanding acts have greater potential for
moral worth; less demanding acts have less potential for moral worth. The notion
of demandingness here is objective, not subjective: Janette might subjectively
experience giving $100 and $10,000 as equally easy, but on some appropriate
external standard the two acts seem to have different moral worth. Conveniently,
we can represent these intuitions by adding additional lines to the Combined
Diagram, with each line representing a more demanding or less demanding act
(Figure 10). Let's associate the lowest line with a trivially non-demanding moral
act: donating $1 (L1). The second line is the line from the Combined Diagram for
donating $100 (L2). The third and fourth lines represent donating $10,000 (L3)
and all one’s resources (L4), respectively.14 There are a few things to note about
this diagram. First, this diagram matches the intuition that the more demanding
14

More demanding acts than L4 are possible, of course – for instance, an agent may sacrifice his or

her life. I don't mean to treat L4 as a maximally demanding act. But I think our intuitions about
life-sacrifice cases are bound to vary considerably because of the plural religious and non-religious
convictions we have. I set extreme or maximally demanding acts aside because of this complexity.
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the act, the higher the minimum moral worth possible. Donating all one's
resources under the worst possible combination of Effort Required and Effort
Expended (“S” in Figure 10) still has a higher moral worth than donating $1 with
no Effort Required or heroic Effort Expended (“T” and “U” in Figure 10).
Second, drawing things in this way allows us to preserve and compare both the
differences in agents (that is, the Effort Required and Effort Expended for
individual agents) and the differences in the demandingness of acts.

Figure 10
Moral Worth
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Consider three issues about combined effort curves and the objective
demandingness of acts. First, must all morally good acts have positive moral
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worth?15 If they do, then Figure 10 is correct: even at the bottom, no bowl-shaped
curve goes below the X-axis. On this view, any morally good act is praiseworthy,
no matter what the amount of effort required or expended.

One could also think

the opposite: that any morally good act can be blameworthy (at least, under the
worst effort conditions); on this view, every curve dips below the X-axis at some
point. I believe that some position between these is the most plausible. It seems
to me that undemanding moral acts can indeed have negative moral worth, but
that some demanding moral acts have a positive moral worth, no matter what
effort is required or expended. Take L1 (donating $1); if it takes Lori
considerable effort to donate only one dollar to a moral cause – if she struggles
against selfish impulses for some time before she finally puts forth the effort to
donate – then her donation seems to have negative moral worth. On the other
hand, if she struggles in a similar way for some time before she finally manages to
donate $10,000, her act nonetheless seems to have positive moral worth. We
expect more demanding moral acts to require more effort, and our evaluations of
moral worth should reflect this. On this mixed position about demandingness and
negative moral worth, Figure 11 captures our intuitions more adequately.

15

This is a good place for a reminder that whenever I use the term “moral worth” in this paper, I

mean only moral worth with respect to effort. Other factors certainly figure into overall moral
worth; but I'm not concerned with them here.

28

Figure 11
Moral Worth
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Second, it's not obvious that the bowl of the curves should be
symmetrically deep. Figure 11 suggests that the difference between the highest
and lowest moral worth possible for any act (of any level of demandingness) is the
same. This is counterintuitive. It seems odd to think that there could be much
difference in moral worth between Janette's donating $1 and Lori's donating $1.
These considerations lead to the view that the less demanding an act, the flatter its
combined effort curve. Similarly, the more demanding an act, the deeper its
combined effort curve. On this view, there is little difference in moral worth
between Janette and Lori, or Nigel and Lori, for donating $1. After all, it's only a
dollar; it would be strange for wide divergences in moral worth to exist over such
a trivial contribution. On the other hand, it seems that rich differences could exist
in the moral worth of more demanding acts. Janette's purity in giving away all her
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resources, or Nigel's Herculean effort exercised in giving away all that he has,
may far outrun Lori's considerable effort to do the same. In their own respective
ways, Janette and Nigel would be almost superhuman, and the moral worth of
their actions should be proportionately higher than Lori's.16 Figure 12 reflects
these views.
Figure 12
Moral Worth
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16

These are my intuitions about the moral worth of very demanding acts; but I can imagine others.

Some will think that Janette's purity and Nigel's effort would be so superhuman in these cases that
our intuitions about moral worth run out. It's hard to praise agents that hardly seem to be human
beings anymore. Another way to describe these intuitions would be this: the moral goodness of
Janette and Nigel would be such that we can no longer evaluate it as human goodness. For these
sorts of intuitions, see Nussbaum (1990, pp. 365-391). How would someone with these intuitions
draw L4 (the most demanding line) in Figure 11? Perhaps as a deep bowl as in Figure 11, but with
leveled-out, flat lips – or perhaps instead as a deep bowl as in Figure 11, with incomplete, cropped
lines near the top of the bowl.
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Third and finally, it may be the case that the two sides of the bowl are not
consistently symmetrical across all levels of demandingness. This is to return to
some considerations raised at the end of the last section. There, we saw that it's
possible to think that combined effort curves are effort-expended asymptotic – that
is, that the moral worth of Effort Expended may not ever “catch up” with the
highest possible moral worth for effortlessness. Two obvious positions are these:
all combined effort curves are effort-expended asymptotic, or no combined effort
curves are effort-expended asymptotic. But of course, with objective
demandingness now on the table, more complex positions are possible. In fact I
think the following more complex position matches our considered intuitions:
combined effort curves for more demanding acts are more effort-expended
asymptotic; combined effort curves for less demanding acts are less (or not)
effort-expended asymptotic.17 Call this position demandingness asymptotism

17

By “more effort-expended asymptotic,” I mean that combined effort curves for very demanding

acts approach their asymptotes even more slowly than somewhat demanding acts. By “less (or not)
effort-expended asymptotic,” I mean that combined effort curves for somewhat demanding moral
acts approach their asymptotes aggressively; and undemanding moral acts may have no asymptote
at all. This position raises a question. If we extended combined effort curve lines infinitely to the
right along the X axis – as we can on the Absolute View of Effort Expended – it would seem that
the non-asymptotic curves would eventually “catch up” with and cross the asymptotic curves. I
take it that our intuitions say that at the extremes of human expended effort, L1-L4 should come
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(mercifully, “DA” hereafter). DA is represented in Figure 13. My intuitions are
fainter here, but DA strikes me as plausible because of the following
considerations. First, no matter how impressive the effort Nigel expends in
donating all his resources (L4), it just doesn't seem as morally special as Janette's
pure, effortless donation. The moral worth of Janette's act seems unreachable by
effort expended alone. By contrast, imagine Nigel expending the same Herculean
effort to donate $1 to UNICEF (L1). Janette's ease of donation seems not only
much less morally special here, but also equaled or outrun by Nigel's expended
effort. Second and relatedly, Figure 13 shows that Nigel has a smaller range of
possible moral worth “scores” than Janette. This matches the view that for high
values of Effort Expended, the particular act is less important – it’s primarily the
raw effort that impresses us, not so much the act that occasioned it. Put another

closer to “catching up” with each other; see my comments on “Effort Expended Merging” below.
But I do not think the non-asymptotic curves cross the asymptotic curves. I should note that I hold
the latter view on the basis of a moral, not a logical or graphical, claim. The moral claim is this: a
more demanding act could never be less morally worthy than a less demanding act at the same
level of effort. With this (moral) constraint in place, instead of crossing, L1-L3 would join L4 and
track it. In any case, even without this constraint, the catching up and crossing would seem to
happen beyond the empirical human limit of Effort Expended. As I said above, I'm supposing that
the maximum magnitude of human effort runs out not far beyond Nigel.
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way, demandingness is less relevant to the moral worth of Effort Expended than it
is to the moral worth of Effort Required. Call this Effort Expended Merging.18

Figure 13

Moral Worth
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Effort

What do we gain by introducing objective demandingness into combined
effort curves? For one thing, the curves capture our intuition that a less
demanding act can be more morally worthy than a more demanding act. In Figure
13, Janette's effortless donation of $100 is more morally worthy than Lori's
labored, effortful, donation of $10,000. Second, if I'm right about the intuitions I
quoted to support DA, we see that Effort Required and Effort Expended vary
asymmetrically with the objective demandingness of acts. This would explain our

18

Note that Effort Expended Merging is also compatible with the Percentage View of Effort

Expended. L1-L4 come close to merging before they stop at 100% of an agent’s effort.
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seemingly paradoxical intuitions about the balance between the two principal
aspects of effort. Extreme effort of the sort put forth by Max and Nigel counts
more toward moral worth for less demanding acts.

3.

Other Effort Modifiers
In the last section, I introduced a new factor into our evaluations of effort.

This factor, objective demandingness, acted as a modifier on the original
Combined Diagram in Figure 2. There are other modifiers as well. For each of
these modifiers, our intuitions seem to be less settled. I won't develop all of them,
but each deserves some notice. I will briefly explore the last modifier I am about
to mention here – agent self-evaluation – in order to provide some idea about how
incorporating such a modifier might go.
First, I’ve said nothing so far about the source of Effort Required or Effort
Expended. Consider two possibilities here. (1) Suppose that Janette's ability to
donate effortlessly is the result of a naturally good character – suppose, that is,
that Janette has always found it easy to share her resources. For some, this will
lower the moral worth of her donation, since her effortlessness is the result of
luck. For others, this will raise the moral worth of her donation, since purity is all
the more praiseworthy the longer it goes back. (2) Now suppose instead that
Janette's ability to donate effortlessly is the result of years of trying to do moral

34

acts; as Aristotle predicted, the more she donated, the easier it became, until
finally donating takes no effort at all. Again, evaluations will go two different
ways here. For some, this will lower the moral worth of Janette’s donation, since
her effortlessness is acquired and recent. For others, this will raise the moral
worth of her donation, since her effortlessness is the result of persistent labor.
Second, Effort Required and Effort Expended may each be composites of
different factors; if so, the curve that describes each could change as the
individual factors change. Take Effort Required: we've treated Effort Required as
“the balance or strength of various moral, non-moral, and contra-moral desires...”
But perhaps balance and strength can act separately as modifiers of combined
effort curves. For example, I’ve been characterizing Janette as lacking contramoral and non-moral desires that work against her moral desires. But to describe
Janette this way is to say nothing yet about the strength of her moral desires.
Suppose we could assign a number to the strength of moral desires; Janette’s
moral desire strength rating (MDSR) is +50, but Janette’s sister, Jeri (who is
equally free from contra-moral and non-moral desires) has a MDSR of +30. It
seems that Jeri’s moral worth would be lower than Janette’s, even though both act
effortlessly. In other words, the strength of an agent’s moral desires is another
modifier of the combined effort curve. Similarly, the balance among an agent’s
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desires – moral, non-moral, and contra-moral – may modify the combined effort
curve.19
A third issue about effort is the agent's own evaluation of the effort
involved in his or her act. For instance, individuals can underrate or overrate
either their Effort Required or Effort Expended, and this may affect our
evaluations of their moral worth.20 There are a variety of ways to cash out what it
means for an agent to evaluate effort. First, an agent may be reflective to varying
degrees about his or her effort. Some think that individuals who are unreflective
about the effort required or expended for an act are more morally worthy than
reflective agents. Others disagree: how can unreflective effort, which may be
accidental and inconsistent, generate a higher moral worth score than reflective
effort? A second way to cash out agent effort self-evaluation is this. Suppose that
an agent reflectively evaluates his or her effort, but evaluates it inaccurately.
Again there seems to be an unresolved disagreement about whether this should
increase or decrease moral worth.
Let's take this second sense of agent effort self-evaluation and see what
influence it has on combined effort curves. (The first sense would be interesting
19

For a helpful discussion of the role of strength and balance among moral, non-moral, and contra-

moral desires, see Smith (1991). See also {self-identifying reference omitted}.
20

For more on agent self-evaluations, see Driver (2001), especially chapter two, “The Virtues of

Ignorance.” See also Richards (1992).
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to investigate as well; my choice to take the second is arbitrary. I merely want to
explore one sort of self-evaluation modifier for combined effort curves.) For
simplicity, I'll only consider inaccurately low self-evaluations – that is, I'll only
look at cases of agents who underrate both the Effort Required and Effort
Expended for a given act. (Inaccurately high self-evaluations, or overratings,
would also be interesting to examine. Again my choice is arbitrary. I'm simply
interested in exploring one case of a self-evaluation modifier for combined effort
curves.) I won't try to settle the disagreement about whether inaccurate selfevaluations increase or decrease moral worth. Instead, I'll play out both sides.
Finally, and again for simplicity, I'll leave aside issues about asymptotes. For this
section, we'll return to the simple bowl-shaped combined effort curve from Figure
2. We could presumably combine the results of this section with the position we
decide to take about asymptotes.
Call the view that claims that agent underratings of effort raise moral
worth the Modesty View. (By using the term “Modesty,” I do not mean that the
agent correctly evaluates his real effort, but at the same time publicly downplays
it. Rather, I mean that he actually underrates his effort while sincerely believing
he has evaluated it correctly.) Call the view that agent underratings of effort
lower moral worth the Accuracy View. I don’t pretend to develop either of these
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views comprehensively; I merely want to offer some sample modifiers of
combined effort curves.
First consider how the combined effort curve might be modified by agent
underratings on the Modesty View. Suppose that Nigel underrates his effort.
“Some effort was involved in my donating, but it's no big deal,” he says, reporting
his beliefs sincerely as he mails his check for $100. On the Modesty View, this
self-evaluation raises Nigel's moral worth.21 Janette's case is tricky. What does it
mean for her to underrate her Effort Required (the dominant, and in fact the only,
aspect of effort in her case)? She can't think she requires less effort to donate than
really is the case, since she requires no effort. But she might undervalue her
donation in another way. Recall that we defined Effort Required as the result of
various factors: the balance and strength of moral, non-moral, and contra-moral
desires, intellectual capabilities, physical capabilities, etc. Perhaps, then, Janette
thinks she has a less favorable balance of desires, or weaker morally good desires,
21

Recall that I stipulated above that we're interested in cases where the agent underrates both

Effort Required and Effort Expended. It may be that on the Modesty View, Nigel's underrating his
Effort Expended counts positively, but his underrating his Effort Required counts negatively. Still,
since Effort Expended is the dominant aspect of effort with respect to moral worth in Nigel's case,
it seems reasonable to suppose that his underratings result in a net positive increase in moral worth.
This is yet one more simplifying assumption I'll make in this section: that the “dominant” aspect of
effort is the one that dictates what we think of self-evaluations as modifiers of moral worth.
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than she actually has. This would be to underrate her Effort Required score in a
different way, and in a way that the Modesty View would see as raising her moral
worth.22 What about Lori? I described Lori as beset with pedestrian selfinterested desires as she tries to donate. In this case, for Lori to underrate both the
Effort Required and the Effort Expended seems to not raise her moral worth at all.
In fact, perhaps Lori's moral worth is lowered by her underrating. Even on (one
plausible version of) the Modesty View, someone hindered in acting morally by
non- and contra-moral desires is hardly more praiseworthy for reflectively
underrating these hinderances. These cases suggest that the Modesty View of
agent underratings affects the basic combined effort curve as indicated in Figure
14. The dotted line in Figure 14 represents the combined effort curve after agent
underratings have been added in.

22

More specifically, the object of Modesty would have to be different in Janette’s case. We

imagine Nigel as underrating the effort he made. But we imagine Janette as underrating something
different: the balance of her desires. I do not pretend to identify all possible objects of modesty
here. I am also assuming that modesty towards either object that I do identify has the same effect.
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Figure 14
Moral Worth
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Are there other factors that change the way that agent underratings modify
combined effort curves on the Modesty View? I think the answer is yes. Here's
an example. When combined effort curves dip below the X-axis, it's reasonable to
suppose that agent underratings lower negative moral worth more dramatically.
In the last paragraph, I suggested that agent underratings could lower moral worth;
I’m now suggesting that below the X-axis, the lowering effect is more drastic. In
section 2 I said that Lori's donation of $1 appears to have negative moral worth.
For Lori to underrate how difficult such a trivial act is for herself makes it all the
less morally worthy. So perhaps agent underratings “deepen” the bowl of
combined effort curves more dramatically for combined effort curves that drop
below the X-axis, as the dotted line suggests in Figure 15. (Relatedly, perhaps
agent underratings make more impact on combined effort curves at lower levels of
objective demandingness.)
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Figure 15
Moral Worth

L1

Effort

So much for some quick intuitions about the Modesty View. Now for the
Accuracy View. On the Accuracy View, agent undervaluings always lower moral
worth. The proponent of this view finds nothing praiseworthy about inaccuracy;
modesty (of the sort discussed above) is no real virtue, since it depends on
incorrect judgments. Nigel is less morally worthy if he evaluates his effort as
lower than it really is. The same goes for Janette: even if her donation requires no
effort, her incorrect evaluation of the balance and strength of her desires and
capabilities counts against moral worth. Perhaps the Accuracy View of agent
underratings results in a straight drop of the combined effort curve without a
shape change. More likely, agent underratings may reduce moral worth more at
the bottom of the curve. If this is the case, agent underratings would change the
combined effort curve to the dotted line in Figure 16.

41

Do other factors change the way that agent underratings modify combined
effort curves on the Accuracy View? Again, I think the answer is yes. Both
objective demandingness and whether the curve dips below the X-axis seem to
change the way that agent underratings modify combined effort curves. I think
these changes parallel the changes these factors made on the Modesty View
above: on the Accuracy View, agent underratings both “deepen” sub-X-axis
curves, and agent underratings make more impact on combined effort curves at
lower levels of objective demandingness (see Figure 17).

Figure 16

Figure 17
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My intuitions are faint on the specific ways in which agent self-evaluations
affect combined effort curves. But the considerations in this section show how
one might go about adding other modifiers about effort.

Effort
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4.

Admirability and Increasability
In section 3, I mentioned several candidate modifiers of the Combined

Diagram – the basic U-shaped curve in Figure 2. I now want to turn to an issue
that exists in even this simple diagram, apart from any modifiers.
Consider Lori. There are two ways her donation can become more morally
worthy:23 either she becomes more like Kent (the kind of person for whom less
effort is required to donate, and who expends that effort), or she becomes more
like Max (the kind of person for whom more effort is required to donate, and who
expends that effort). Note that from the point of view of moral worth, it’s
arbitrary which of the two she becomes more like. Either way, her moral worth
score will rise. This may seem counter-intuitive for at least two different reasons.
The first sort of counter-intuitiveness can be addressed with tools from the
previous sections. The second sort of counter-intuitiveness comes from a
misunderstanding.
The first sort of counter-intuitiveness is this: from the point of view of
moral worth, perhaps it is arbitrary whether Lori becomes either like Kent or Max;
but it doesn’t seem arbitrary whether Lori becomes either like Janette or Nigel. If
Lori can become more like one of these agents, she should choose Janette. But
this response may just amount to an acceptance of the position that combined
23

Recall that by “moral worth,” I mean only “moral worth with respect to effort.”
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effort curves are effort-expended asymptotic. On this position, Lori can attain the
highest possible moral worth only if she becomes more like Janette. The answer
still leaves arbitrary which way Lori goes in the (vertically) lower regions of effort
– the space between Kent and Max, for example. But this is as we would expect:
if what I’ve claimed above is right, our intuitions are that even with effortexpended asymptotic combined effort curves, someone like Kent and someone
like Max can be equally praiseworthy.
The second sort of counter-intuitiveness is based on the intuition that if
one had the choice, it would just be better to be more like Kent and Janette than to
be like Max and Nigel. Who wouldn’t prefer to be like Janette or Kent, for whom
moral action is easy, rather than like Max or Nigel, who have to struggle to do
what is right? But this intuition misunderstands the arbitrariness in question here.
The arbitrariness I’m calling attention to in Lori’s decision is merely arbitrariness
with respect to moral worth. Our broader moral intuitions certainly seem to be
that it would be better to be Kent than Max; but one can believe this and still hold
that from the pure point of view of moral worth, Kent and Max are equally
praiseworthy.
It’s worth dwelling on our broader moral intuitions for a moment longer
here. If what I’ve said above is correct, we’ve come closer to capturing and
explaining some complex intuitions about effort and moral worth. But we seem
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to have quite divergent broader moral intuitions about the two key components of
combined effort curves: Effort Required and Effort Expended. Minimal or no
Effort Required – call it Effortlessness for convenience – is the sort of moral value
we seem to want to increase.24 In contrast, we do not want to increase the amount
of Effort Expended. Put another way, it’s a good thing if more and more people
find it easy to do moral acts, but it’s generally not a good thing if more and more
people find themselves having to expend tremendous effort to do moral acts.
Effortlessness and Effort Expended are different with respect to whether we want
more of them or not. Effortlessness and Effort Expended are both (at least partly)
intrinsic moral values; they seem to be valuable apart from or in addition to any
ends to which they contribute. An interesting entailment, then, of the difference
between the two is that admirability can come apart from increasability for
intrinsic values. That is, our intuitions about Effort Expended show that an
intrinsic value can be admirable without it necessarily being a good thing to
increase its instances or amount.25
The importance of the distinction is this: with this distinction in hand, we
now have an explanation for our reluctance to think that it’s arbitrary from the

24

I say “increase” instead of “maximize” in order to include satisficers. A satisficer may want to

increase the Effortlessness up to a certain threshold.
25

I thank Allen Wood for helpful discussion here.
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broader point of view of morality which “direction” Lori goes. This distinction
about intrinsic values explains our view that it’s better for Lori to become more
like Kent and Janette.

Given his negative assessment of Moore, it’s reasonable to assume that
Wittgenstein found morality to be a struggle. If what I’ve said above is correct,
our moral evaluations of effort are rich enough to give credit to both Moore’s
“innocence” and Wittgenstein’s struggle – without inconsistency. Effort has
proved to be a more complex notion than it at first appears. Moral worth proper,
of which effort is merely one factor, is thus all the more complex as well.

